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A Modern History of Technology in Japan (Ⅱ):
Synopsis of a Lecture from the Socio-economic Perspective
ICHIKAWA Hiroshi
School of Integrated Arts and Sciences, Hiroshima University
Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hiroshima University
Continued from the previous volume.1
VIII. Technological Transformation 
in Occupied Japan.2
1. Socio-economic Changes under the Occupation
　　The political, economic, social and cultural 
changes that arise under the occupation are 
consequences of the interactions between 
the occupiers and the occupied. Various 
historical studies that were conducted since 
the public release of the Records of the General 
Headquarters of Supreme Commander for 
Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) show that there 
used to be intense conflicts between the 
occupation, i.e., the GHQ/SCAP, and the 
Japanese government and Japanese business 
circles.
　　The Occupation took priority over all 
other subjects in the investigation of Japan’s 
remaining ability to fight a war due to the 
fear of Japan’s concealed war potential. 
Then, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers, adopted 
a policy not to participate in the economic 
issues, except for the repeated reductions of the 
compensation.
　　However, once the Republican Party 
won the US off-year election in 1946, the US 
government sought to make the occupied areas 
economically independent to ease the financial 
burden of the US taxpayers. They estimated 
that the occupied areas, which included Japan 
and some parts of Germany, would become 
economically independent by 1951-53 with 95-
120 million dollars of US aid. They set up the 
financial measures for this purpose. These 
included the Government Appropriation for 
Relief in Occupied Areas Fund (GARIOA) 
programme in October of  1946 and the 
Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas 
(EROA) plan in 1948. Within the GHQ/SCAP, 
the Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) 
drafted out the plans for Japan’s economic 
independence. They issued a comprehensive 
plan, entitled “Possibility of Balanced Japanese 
Economy (Green Book)” in October 1947, 
which was followed by “Programme for Self-
Supporting Japanese Economy (Blue Book)” 
in November of 1948. They persuaded the 
Japanese government to accept these plans. 
The Japanese government eventually agreed 
with the GHQ/SCAP on the main points 
and introduced their Nine-Point Economic 
Stabilisation Programme in December 1948.
　　After the Korean War broke out in June 
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1950, the ESS drafted the “Industrial Expansion 
Programme,” which intended to make Japan 
a logistics base for the US Military in Eastern 
Asia.
　　On the other hand, Japanese business 
circles were repulsed by the anti-trust and 
cartel policy of the Occupation, but they kept 
their concerns private for a long time. After the 
surrender, several Japanese firms often made 
profits from so-called “Hoarding of Materials” 
or “Sabotage (Slow-down) of Production” in 
a hyper-inflated market. In 1947, the social 
democratic government of Japan promoted 
some important industries, such as the coal 
industry and the chemical fertiliser industry, 
with generous financial support from the 
Fukkô Kinyû Kôko (Governmental Finance 
Corporation for Recovery: in short: Fukkin). 
They could also take advantage of “the Multiple 
Currency Exchanging Rates” that correspond 
to the international competitiveness of each 
industry.
　　A prominent American banker, Joseph 
Dodge, visited Japan as a financial advisor of 
the GHQ/SCAP and persuaded the Japanese 
government to do away with its artificial 
sustainment of the fragile Japanese economy 
that was precariously supported by Fukkin and 
“the Multiple Currency Exchanging Rates.” 
The Occupation intended to make Japan 
adopt the “normality” of capitalism. A series 
of policies, known as the “Dodge Line,” were 
then introduced. These policies, which were 
named after Joseph Dodge, were directed 
toward the normalisation of Japanese economy 
brought about large-scale shake-up of excessive 
manpower and non-efficient production 
facilities.
　　The Korean War commenced in June of 
1950, while Japan was in the midst of the 
economic depression that was caused by the 
“Dodge Line.” This resulted in the “Special 
Procurements Boom,” which was called “a 
welcome rain during the dry season” by then 
Prime Minister, Yoshida, Shigeru. Then, the 
“Strategic Agreement” between the Occupation 
(or the US government behind them) and the 
Japanese government and the business circles 
was finalised.
2. The Scientific and Technical Division of 
the Economic and Scientific Section, 
GHQ/SCAP: The Policies, Activities and 
Accomplishments.
　　In September of 1945, near the beginning 
of the Occupation, two American scientists, 
Dr. Karl T. Compton, the elder brother of 
Arthur Compton and the Chancellor of 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology at the 
time, and Edward Moreland, the then dean of 
MIT, reached Japan. At the instruction of the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 
General Douglas MacArthur, they organised 
the Special Scientific Mission and carried 
out an overall investigation for almost two 
months on the wartime scientific efforts and 
the research activities of various Japanese 
scientific and technological facilities. Their 
investigation aimed to clarify Japan’s scientific 
potential for hostile action against the Allied 
Nations in accordance with the paragraphs of 
the “Joint Council of Staffs (JCS) 1380/15” (JCS 
Serial 18, November 3, 1945).
　　On September 7, 1945, another investigative 
group ―headed by Major Robert R. Furman― 
who is well-known for his active role in 
the “Alsos Mission ,”  was organised as a 
substructure of the Atomic Bomb Mission, 
which was first commanded by Brigadier 
General Thomas F. Farrell and then by 
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Brigadier General J.B. Newman. Having 
investigated Japan’s scientific efforts to 
develop atomic bombs, known as Operation 
“Ni” and Operation “F,” and its geological and 
mineralogical surveillance for uranium ore 
in Korea and Northern Chinese districts that 
were formerly occupied by the Japanese Army, 
they submitted their final report that consisted 
of more than 30 of field reports and interview 
records to the U.S. Department of the Army 
and the Manhattan Engineering District on 
September 28, 1945.
　　The function of conducting such investigations 
was handed over to the Scientific and Technical 
Division (ST) of the ESS. In addition to “JCS 
1380/15,” “Directive No.3 (SCAPIN 47)” was 
introduced on the same day. A paragraph 
within the latter mandated that all Japanese 
scientific and technological institutions, 
including universities, were to submit their 
monthly activity reports to the GHQ/SCAP (ST 
was in charge). Hence, the ST’s report entitled 
“Review of the Third Year of Occupation” 
stated, “The first year of occupation was 
characterised by a programme of constant 
surveillance and investigation into scientific 
research having particular war potential” [cited 
from a document titled, ESS/ST, “Review of 
Third Year of Occupation,” p.1, in Literature ② 
at the end of this chapter)
　　However, as clarified in many earlier 
studies, the wartime research and development 
projects had a merely transient and mobile 
basis and lacked the requisite material means 
and funds. Therefore, the mobilisation systems 
of the scientific and technological talents and 
resources were disintegrated once the war 
ended. It had been made clear that Japan’s 
scientific and technological potential were no 
longer any menace to the Allied Nations, until 
“Directive No. 3,” which prohibited research 
that could be possibly used by the military, was 
released. On May 25, 1946, the scientific and 
technological institutions’ obligation to submit 
the monthly activity reports to the GHQ/SCAP 
was loosened and replaced by the obligation 
to submit semi-annual reports once every 
six months. Thus, the elimination of Japan’s 
war potential in various fields of scientific 
and technological research was de facto 
accomplished almost without any interference 
from the Occupation. At that moment, the 
ST’s policies were re-oriented to ensure a 
greater contribution of Japan’s scientific and 
technological potential toward its economic 
rehabilitation. The draft for their report, 
“History of Non-Military Activities of Japan” 
stated the following.
　　　“At a relatively early period, it became 
clear that the democratisation of Japan would 
depend in large measure upon economic 
rehabilitation. Hence, at an early stage in 
the Occupation, emphasis shifted from the 
surveillance function to a policy of friendly 
guidance designed to increase the ability 
of Japanese scientists and technologists to 
contribute to the economic rehabilitation 
effort. The advice and guidance function of 
ESS in this area of operation therefore came 
to be of major importance at an early stage 
in the Occupation, and led to the formulation 
of a group of programs and projects, the 
implementation of which constitutes the 
major accomplishments of the Section in this 
field.” [cited from a document titled, ESS/ST, 
Draft for “History of Non-Military Activities 
of Japan.” p.6, in Literature ②].
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　　What did they mean by the words, 
“economic rehabilitation?”  Their annual 
report of 1948 stated, “The introduction of 
new scientific and technical techniques is now 
more essential to Japan than ever before for 
they must replace the cheaper labour available 
under the old feudalistic system. Substitutes 
must be developed for the lack of raw materials 
formerly available to Japan and efficiency must 
conserve her very limited natural resources.” 
[cited from a document titled, ESS/ST, “Review 
of Third Year ...” op.cit., p.9]. This implies that 
they attempted to make the Japanese economy 
acceptable to “the peaceful nations of the 
world,” which were probably comprised of the 
capitalist nations that the United States was 
leading. Thus, the economic lever for Japan’s 
imperialistic expansion ― namely its cheaper 
labour and the lower productivity required 
for the cheaper export-commodities that 
resulted in its advantageous competitiveness ― 
was eliminated. Under such a recognition the 
Division developed their policies in the second 
half of the Occupation. In opposition to “the old 
feudalistic system,” they sought to mobilise the 
scientific and technological potential of Japan 
to facilitate its industrial recovery through 
their efforts, as described in the following 
section of this chapter. The activities of the ST 
can be classified into five fields: 1) industrial 
standardisation, 2) industrial property rights, 
3) industrial research, 4) improvement of 
quality control, and 5) renewal of scientific 
organisations.
Industrial standardisation: In the second year of 
the Occupation, the ESS/ST made the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry rearrange and unify 
the complicated industrial standard systems 
and re-establish contact with the Comité 
International des Poides et Mesures (Sèvres, 
France) to facilitate Japan’s return to the 
world market. The ST aimed at devising “plans 
for the Japanese to stimulate standardization 
for domestic progress and further acceptance 
of their products in foreign market.” [cited 
from a document titled, Summery ESS/ST 
Activities for “Report on Political and Economic 
Conditions in Japan,”  24 Sept. 1947, in 
Literature ②]
　　In July of 1948, the Export Commodities 
Control Law was promulgated, which was 
expected to  provide the foundation for 
establishing the system that ensured the 
quality of exported goods. While the restriction 
on international trade by the Japanese was 
gradually eased from March, 1946, and the 
export of Japanese goods increased, the 
ESS feared that numerous “cheap”  and 
“poor quality” commodities might flow into 
the foreign markets, particularly the Asian 
markets.
　 　 S i m u l t a n e o u s l y,  d o m e s t i c  e f f o r t s 
such as the organisation of more than one 
hundred quality-control associations and the 
standardisation of technical terminology in 
Japanese language were also undertaken. 
However, the ST complained of inefficiency 
in the organisation of work related to quality 
control despite the involvement of around 
200,000 people in such work. In those days, 
the Japanese Engineering Standards and the 
Emergency Japanese Engineering Standards 
coexisted disharmoniously. Both of them were 
de facto determined by large manufacturers 
without consideration of the requirements 
of medium and small manufacturers or 
consumers. Such rules were to be replaced 
with “democratised” and rationalised ones. 
The Industrial Standardisation Law  that 
the ST longed for finally passed the Diet in 
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1949 and came into effect on August 1. It 
was accompanied by the amendment of the 
Export Commodities Control Law in December. 
The control of the competent Ministry was 
reinforced.  Thus,  the Japan Industrial 
Standards (JIS)  were established.  The 
standards were to be determined by a board 
that was comprised of representatives from 
the government, large manufacturers and 
small manufacturers. The new standardisation 
system had a fair and strict statistical quality 
inspection system, which was the first in 
Japan’s modern history. Although the ST 
favourably received the establishment of the 
JIS, they were disappointed by the negative 
att i tudes  o f  the  Japanese  authorit ies , 
who almost gave up on conducting quality 
inspection for the export commodities to some 
Asian countries. 
　　　“Japanese government officers have 
strongly advocated writing high minimum 
standards under the Export Commodities 
Control Law and authorizing the competent 
Minister to waive the standards for export of 
commodities to Asiatic countries or elsewhere 
where the reputation of high quality of 
Japanese goods in not considered important.” 
[cited form, ESS/ST Draft for ... op. cit., p.16, 
in Literature ②]
　　They were also aware of the possible 
recession of democratisation. They stated “the 
possibility is recognised that in Japan the 
eventual result might be a tendency to use 
the standards as a mean of control of small 
manufacturers.” [ibid., p.16]
Industrial property rights: Issues related to 
patents and trademarks are essentially legal 
issues. Therefore, the Legal Section (LS) and 
the Office of Civil Property Custodian (CPC) 
of the GHQ/SCAP took charge of those issues. 
Although the ST was limited to an advisory 
role with respect to the technical aspects of 
the matter, they came to be deeply involved 
in them, because the ESS was perturbed 
by the unfair competition prevalent within 
the Japanese market ,  which infr inged 
foreign industrial property rights. Until 
the amendment of the Unfair Competition 
Preventive Law, which came into effect on May 
1, 1950, the ST made a great effort to organise 
the legal regulations on industrial rights and to 
educate the Japanese about the significance of 
industrial property rights. 
　　In the second year of the Occupation, the 
ST began to reorganise the Japanese patent 
system. At first, they made the Japanese 
government prepare a law that aimed to 
properly price the patent fee and abolish the 
concealed patents used by the military. In the 
following year, the ST made advances in the 
rearrangement of the classification system 
for patents in accordance with their end uses 
and the amendment of the Patent Law. In 
addition, they undertook the role of educating 
the concerned Japanese parties regarding 
industrial rights during that year.
　　Despite their best efforts, infringements 
of industrial property rights by the Japanese 
occurred so frequently that even during the 
final stage of the Occupation, the ST had to 
highlight the possibility that “infringements 
of foreign design, patents, trademarks, etc., 
may continue” even after the Peace Treaty. It 
appears that the reestablishment of the link 
between Japan’s patent system and those of 
foreign countries was delayed for this reason. 
As of January 1950, only the United States 
and the United Kingdom responded positively 
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to the proposal to re-establish the linkage in 
industrial property rights from the Japanese 
side. Not only for the re-establishment of 
such international linkage, but also for the 
promotion of investment from abroad to Japan, 
the problem of the industrial property right 
protects was of crucial significance. 
　　　“It is quite likely that some time to 
come Japan will be energetically interested 
in securing introduction of foreign capital 
to stimulate the rate of development. One 
of the prime factors considered by a foreign 
investor is the protection afforded him in 
Japan for his industrial property rights. He 
wants to know what protection he will have 
for patents, designs, and trademarks. The 
answer to this question hinges on the type 
of administration afforded to the new laws 
enacted at the instigation of the Occupation.” 
[cited from, ESS/ST Draft for ... op. cit., p.16, 
in Literature ②]
Industrial research: In early days of the 
Occupation, the ST made a great effort to 
protect private industrial research laboratories 
from the negative impact of the dissolution of 
Zaibatsu (large-scale monopolistic industrial 
and financial combines). Moreover, such 
laboratories at the brink of collapse due to the 
damage caused to them by the war and their 
lack of financial support. The ST appealed other 
sections of the GHQ/SCAP to provide them with 
support. In 1949, the ST conducted an overall 
investigation on Japanese laboratories “in an 
effort to determine which laboratories were (or 
were capable of) contributing effectively to the 
economic rehabilitation of Japan” [1949 Annual 
Historical Report. 20 Jan. 1950, pp.23-25: in 
Lirerature ②]. Based on this investigation, the 
ST suggested eliminating certain inefficient 
research laboratories.
　　The ST also attempted to establish an 
entirely new organisation that integrated the 
research and testing laboratories within the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, so that 
they might have enough authority to stand up 
to those of the Ministry of Education. This plan 
was realised through the establishment of the 
Agency of Industrial Science and Technology in 
1948. Their basic recognition was as follows.
　　　“ . . .  this ministry [the Ministry of 
Education ― the writer] was charged with 
responsibility for administrating an overly 
large part of the national government’s 
programme of support of research, resulting in 
a continuing over-emphasis on fundamental 
research in national research programme. 
In another ministry (the fore-runner of the 
present Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry ― MITI) there was a totally 
inadequate degree of coordination between 
the various research and testing laboratories 
associated with the Ministry, indicating 
a need for an administrative revision of 
considerable magnitude.” [ cited from, ESS/
ST Draft for ... op. cit., p.5, in Literature ②]
　　In 1949, the ST drafted a plan, entitled 
“The Importation of Technology Programme,” 
which was sought to facilitate the provision of 
both of visible and invisible technical assistance 
to Japan by taking advantage of the SCAP 
Commercial Account Funds to supplement the 
insufficient foreign currency reserve of Japan. 
This programme facilitated the following: 
1) foreign technological assistance and/or 
patent acquisitions by the Japanese, 2) the 
usage of foreign industrial property rights 
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by the Japanese, 3) organisation of visits to 
the United States by Japanese scientists and 
engineers, 4) the import of scientific equipment 
and instruments, 5) the import of industrial 
equipment, 6) the import of the scientific and 
technological literature, 7) payment of the 
affiliation fee to the international scientific 
organisations on behalf of the Japanese government 
or its domestic scientific societies. However, 
according to the ST, the achievements of these 
plans were estimated to be insufficient due to 
the indifference of the Japanese businesses 
toward the application of advanced technology 
in the industrial production.
　　Nevertheless, the scientific magazines 
and literature that were supplied by the US 
and the imported scientific equipment and 
instruments contributed significantly to the 
post-war development of Japanese science, 
which transformed in various ways through 
its encounter with the American style of 
scientific research. In this regard, the GHQ/
SCAP established the Interchange of Persons 
Board in July of 1949, which the Deputy 
Director of the ST, Dr. Bowen C. Dees, attended 
on behalf of the ST. This board was assigned 
to carry out GARIOA Project 452: National 
Leader Programme and was allotted a budget of 
450,000 dollars. It was designed to facilitate the 
generation of pro-American groups in various 
field of Japanese social life through organising 
visits to the United States for the Japanese. 
The programme included a number of missions 
concerned with scientific and technological 
areas. 
Improvement of quality control: It must 
be noted that several special staff sections 
of  the GHQ/SCAP or AFPAC (US Army 
Forces Pacific) developed their own efforts 
to improve the management of operations. 
The Headquarters of Far Eastern Air Forces 
(FEAF) developed the Indigenous Persons 
Training Programme for Japanese workers to 
make their operations smooth and elaborate. 
The Civil Communication Section (CCS) of 
the GHQ/SCAP organised a series of lectures 
on management training for Japanese private 
manufacturers and those working on the 
construction of the electrical communication 
equipment and lines. These lectures were 
called CCS Kôza. The Labour Division of the 
ESS introduced a training programme, entitled 
Training within Industry for Supervisor (TWI), 
for the reinforcement of appropriate discipline. 
　　On March 10, 1950, L. Q. Moss, who 
belonged to the Adult Education Branch in the 
Education Division of the Civil Information 
and Education Section (CIE) of the GHQ/
SCAP, called representatives from various 
sections that were concerned the improvement 
of the industrial management to a meeting. 
At this meeting, a coordinating board was 
organised. The next meeting was held on 
March 17, 1950. The meeting was officially 
named the Conference on a Programme for 
Improvement of Industrial Management in 
Japan and was assigned to systematise various 
efforts and trials in the GHQ/SCAP and make 
the Japanese comprehend the importance of 
rational management. The ST was in charge 
of inviting American specialists in the field 
of management. They sent a letter to F. 
Schneider from the American Management 
Association and dispatched Deputy Director 
Dees to the United States in June to look 
for suitable individuals. The Engineering 
Education Mission that was proposed by 
Dees finally visited Japan in the summer of 
1951. A combined meeting of the Conference, 
which was attended by numerous Japanese 
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representatives, was held on June 15―
immediately before the outbreak of the Korean 
War. 
Renewal of scientific organisations: During 
the first stage of the Occupation, the ST had 
to discharge scientists from the mobilisation 
for military research and development by 
restricting research for military use and 
dissolving the Gakujutsu-Kenkyû Kaigi (National 
Research Council: Also known as Gakken), 
which played the central (but unsuccessful) 
role in directing scientific activities toward 
militaristic endeavours. They ordered to 
radically change the Japan Society for the 
Promotion of Science (JSPS) ―the main body for 
the scientific mobilisation― to render it into 
a scholarship organisation that would have 
relatively little influence on such matters. 
During the war the JSPS had financially 
supported the application of scientific findings 
to expansionist plans, which included subjects 
such as military research, the development 
of raw materials in the areas occupied by 
Japanese Imperial Army and so on. On the 
other hand, the ST encouraged Japanese 
scientists to establish a new organisation, 
which was later called the Japan Science 
Council (JSC). The council was a democratically 
elected body of scientists that was suitable 
for the international linkage with various 
scientific organisation of the world and had a 
high level of authority as an advisory body to 
governmental agencies. The ST simultaneously 
sought to establish a governmental body for 
administrative action. Thus, the Scientific and 
Technical Administrative Commission (STAC) 
was formed and attached to the Cabinet as 
a coordinating agency. However, the STAC 
achieved limited success.
　　The ST was able to be in direct contact 
with the Japanese scientists in this field. 
Many Japanese scientists were impressed by 
the ST’s commitment to the renewal of the 
nation’s scientific organisations. Dr. Harry 
C. Kelly, another Deputy Director of the ST, 
was particularly appreciated. He was later 
called even “a benefactor of Japanese science.” 
There was, however, a difference in perspective 
between the ST and the Japanese scientists 
who participated in the renewal movement. 
As early as the JSC’s establishment in 1948, 
the ST stated that “scientists who have 
worked at removing the feudalistic elements 
in national scientific organisations still do not 
fully appreciate exigency of this transition” 
(the transfer of the Occupation policies to the 
priority of the economic rehabilitation ― the 
author) [ cited from, ESS/ST, “Review of Third 
Year...” op. cit., p.9, in Literature ②]. 
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IX. The High Economic Growth
1. Overview of “Japan’s Miracle”3
　　The annual growth rate of Japan’s Gross 
National Product exceeded 10% twelve times 
between 1955 and 1973, whereas those of 
other Western Bloc nations never exceeded 
10%, except for Western Germany achieving 
it once. Japan’s GNP fell in below 5% only 
twice, although the United States experienced 
the same 10 times, the United Kingdom 
experienced it 17 times and in Western 
Germany was witnessed such a slump 7 times. 
Japan’s GNP increased 4.6 times over that 
period, whereas that of Western Germany’s 
increased 2.3 times, the United States’ GNP 
increased 1.7 times and that of the United 
Kingdom increased 1.5 times. [ Hereafter to the 
end of this section, the numerical indices are 
cited mainly from the literature ① at the end of 
this chapter.]
The international context :  The extreme 
sophistication of armament due to the Cold 
War and the Vietnamese War made the US 
economy so militarised that its citizens’ 
demand for everyday mass-produced industrial 
products, such as textile goods, home electric 
appliances and automobiles had to be met with 
imported goods. [See, Literature ① and ② at 
the end of this chapter] Japanese industrial 
products rushed into the consumer markets of 
the United States, particularly in the second 
half of 1960s. In addition, the fixed exchange 
rate of currency ―which was long maintained 
at the rate of one dollar for 360 Japanese Yen 
despite the US’ constant fiscal deficit and its 
chronic currency crises due to its immense 
expenditure on defence and overseas aid― 
worked in Japan’s favour. 
　　As a result of Japan’s surrender in World 
War II, it lost its colonies and the spheres of 
influence from which it had previously gained 
natural resources and industrial raw materials. 
During the post-war period, Japan came to 
rely upon the United States and its allies to 
obtain natural resources and raw materials, 
such as petroleum from American and British 
oil companies and iron ore from Australia. 
On the other hand, in some industries, such a 
change in the import trade made it necessary 
and possible to build new giant plants without 
incurring any cost for scrapping older facilities 
and equipment. In many cases, the Japanese 
iron and steel manufacturers lacked blast 
furnaces in their home land during the pre-
war period, because they depended upon the 
northern part of China and India for the supply 
of pig iron and on the United States for that 
of scrap iron. Additionally, pre-war Japan’s 
largest (albeit outdated) chemical plant was 
located in colonial Korea. 
The domestic factors: With respect to the 
basic structure of Japan’s Gross National 
Expenditure (GNE) (Table 1), the expansion of 
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the fixed capital formation in the private sector 
exceeded that of the personal consumption 
expenditure and the government purchases by 
a great degree. From 1955 to 1973, the ratio of 
the personal consumption expenditure in GNE 
decreased by 11.6%, dropping from 62.1% to 
50.5%. In the United States, this parameter 
was constantly more than 70%. Additionally, 
Japan’s ratio of fixed capital formation 
increased by 12.8% (from 10.6% to 27.7%). 
Thus, personal consumption and welfare was 
sacrificed for the sake of capital accumulation.
　　The currency and credits were excessively 
supplied by the budgetary public investment, 
the ex-budgetary financial investment and loan, 
the credits of the Bank of Japan and public 
debts. The high-rate investment often exceeded 
the real capital accumulation by the private 
enterprises. The low level of public welfare, 
especially the insufficient pension, forced 
the Japanese people to save their money as 
individual savings. A large part of such saved 
money flowed into the government through the 
post-office saving system as the “the Second 
Budget,” which was officially known as the 
Governmental Financial Investment Plans. It 
was utilised for the governmental projects for 
developing industrial and urban infrastructure.
　　Owing to the lack of a job priority system, a 
qualification system or a job grading system, an 
employee could be reshuffled within firms. Such 
an employment system facilitated technological 
innovations. To acquire cheap, half-fabricated 
goods and parts, the large manufacturers could 
take advantage of the hierarchical structure 
that consisted of various subcontractors, 
which often were the medium and small 
manufacturers that had lost a large amount of 
the former military procurement. As a result, 
the labour productivity in Japan increased by 
284.4% from 1960 to 1970. In contrast, the rate 
of increase in labour productivity in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, 
France and Italy during this period was 
134.8%, 134.0%, 178.3%, 182.4%, and 188.9%, 
respectively.
Science and Technology Policies: The policies 
related to science and technology that were 
designed to achieve high economic growth 
consisted mainly of the taxation-induced system 
for the promotion of importation of technology 
from abroad and specialist education. These 
included the Exemption of the Imported Tariff 
on Imported Machineries (1951), the Reduction 
of Withholding Tax Rate on the Rental Fees 
for the Important Foreign Technologies 
(1953), the Special Deduction on Overseas 
Technology Trading and so on. Such a series of 
taxation policies stimulated the technological 
development mainly thanks to the imported 
technologies. These policies simultaneously 
strengthened Japan’s technological dependence 
upon the United States and other Western 
countries (see, Table 2). As for the specialist 
Table 1: Real Gross National Expenditure of Japan, 1955-1973
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education, the government planned to train 
170,000 students in scientific and engineering 
specialties for ten years from 1960 to 1970 (10-
year Plan for the Promotion of Science and 
Technology in 1960). This plan facilitated the 
establishment of faculties of engineering within 
universities throughout Japan. The Japanese 
engineers in those days devoted themselves 
to making partial improvements or reducing 
production costs by using the imported 
technology.[See, Literature ③]
The basic feature of technological development: 
Toda, Shintarô: The overall technological 
development during Japan’s economic boom was 
characterised in one phrase by the outstanding 
economist, Toda, Shintarô.[See, Literature ⑧] He 
characterised it as “(Production) on a large scale, 
in succession and with high speed.”
　　By building large-scale apparatuses, 
“economy of scale” (also known as “scale 
merit”) was pursued throughout. The capital 
investment was concentrated in the heavy 
industries (Table 3), where the entrepreneurs 
could take maximum advantage of “scale 
mer i t . ”  Accord ing  to  Toda ’s  e conomic 
calculation, scaling up may facilitate the saving 
of land, buildings, warehouses, and fuel. For 
example, increase in crude steel production 
from 2,500,000 tons annually to 5,000,000 
tons leads to a 5-10% reduction of investment 
and reduces the cost by 20-25% per unit. Toda 
indicated that intensive expansion is more 
Table 2: Foreign Technology Trade, 1960-1968
*unit = 1 million U.S. dollar



































































































































































Source: The Agency of Science and Technology, The White Paper  on Science and Technology in 1969.
Table 3: Structure of Investment in Industrial Equipmemt in Postwar Japan.
*unit =1 milliard yen.

















































































































Total 5,710 (100.0%) 5,870 (100.0%) 14,237 (100.0%)
Source: The Economic Planning Agency, Survey on Economy, in various years.
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significant. If the production capacity of steel 
making equipment (a converter) was enlarged 
from 50,000 tons to 300,000 tons annually (six 
times), then the investment on the equipment 
would also increase, however, from 2,200 
million yen to 5,400 million. (less than three 
times) The ratio of labour expenses in the 
production cost would be reduced from 4.60% to 
1.04%.
　　Automation (Detroit-Type) enabled the 
speeding up of mechanical processes. Thanks 
to the introduction of transfer machines 
and transfer presses, various processes 
of fabrication and plasticity processing 
were effectively realised. In particular, the 
introduction of new methods of plasticity 
processing significantly contributed to the 
rapid growth of the labour productivity. 
Although the wing clogs of a fighter plane were 
made using 272 metal sheets with 3,200 rivets, 
they could now be constructed with only one 
stroke of the 35,000 ton press machine, which 
also reduced the weight of the object by 50 kg. 
Such automation was widely introduced in 
the machinery industries, which include the 
automobile industries and the home electric 
appliance industries.
　　The newly built large-scale industrial 
complex, known as Kombinat, secured ceaseless 
production. The construction of the “Coastal 
Integrated Iron and Steel Works” in particular 
were extremely advantageous in economising 
the transportation costs of raw material, 
fuel and steel products. “Oil Refinement and 
Petrochemical Complexes,” which were first 
built during the late 1950s, facilitated the 
production of a great number of cars and 
industrial fuels and a great variety of chemical 
products. 
2. The Tremendous Development of the 
Apparatus Industries
　　The rapid growth of some apparatus 
industries was the most remarkable feature of the 
High Economic Growth. Therefore, we examine 
the developments of iron and steel making 
[based mainly on Literature ⑩] and petrochemical 
industry [based mainly on Literature ⑪] here. 
The coastal integrated iron and steel works: 
In light of India gaining independence, the 
communists’ triumph in the Chinese civil 
war and other changes in the Asian political 
landscape, post-war Japan could no longer 
rely on other Asian nations for the supply of 
cheap pig iron and iron ore. The Japanese iron 
and steel makers had to cover the shortage 
of pig iron supply by building several new 
blast furnaces. In the 1960s, many large-
scale integrated iron and steel works, which 
combined large blast furnaces and steelmaking, 
were built in various Japanese coastal areas to 
minimise transportation costs. These included 
Nagoya Works of Fuji Iron and Steel Company 
(constructed in 1960), Sakai Works (1961), 
and Kimitsu Works (1962) of Yahata Iron and 
Steel Company (Later, Yahata and Fuji were 
merged into Shin-Nihon Iron and Steel Co. 
Ltd.), Mizushima Works of Kawasaki Iron and 
Steel Co. (1961), Kakogawa Works of Kôbe Iron 
and Steel Co. (1964), Fukuyama Works of Nihon 
Kôkan Co. (presently known as JFE) (1965), 
Kashima Works of Sumitomo Metal Industries 
Ltd. (1968), Ôita Works of Shin-Nihon Iron 
and Steel Co. Ltd. (1971), and others. At these 
plants, many gigantic blast furnaces that had 
an inner volume greater than 1,000m3 were 
built one after another. For example, whereas 
the first blast furnace of Fukuyama Works 
already had an inner volume of 2,323m3, its 
newest furnace had a volume of 4,664m3. 
137A Modern History of Technology in Japan (Ⅱ)
The internal volume of the fourth furnace at 
Mizushima reached 5,005m3. The iron and steel 
makers adopted a high top pressure operation 
and a heavy oil supplement to utilise heat 
advantageously. The latter method worsened 
the air pollution due to the sulphur oxide 
being emitted from the blast furnace. Sulphur 
oxide was not been supposed to be emitted 
from a blast furnace, which naturally requires 
sulphur-free fuel. 
　　What is the most remarkable in the 
development  o f  i ron and steel  making 
technology in post-war Japan is the rapid 
replacement of the method of steel making, 
which transitioned from using open hearth 
furnaces to using Linz-Donawitz (LD) steel 
converters. While steel made in open-hearth 
furnaces accounted for almost 80% of the total 
output in Japan in 1955, steel made in the LD 
converters accounted for approximately 90% of 
the total output in 1980. LD steel converters 
were developed in the early 1950s and offered 
high productivity by using pure oxygen for the 
oxidation of (or removal of carbon from) pig iron 
in a crucible shaped like a pear. LD converters 
produced high quality steel that did not contain 
impurities such as phosphorus and nitrogen. 
Although open-hearth furnaces ―which were 
invented in the second half of the nineteenth 
century and functioned as improved and scaled-
up reverberators― provided a qualitatively 
wide range of steel and treated with a variety 
in quality of pig iron as material, they were 
more time-consuming to operate in comparison 
to LD converters.
Fig.29, A view of a coastal integrated iron and steel 
works (Fukuyama Works)
Source: Pamphlet of Nihon Kôkan Co. Ltd., NKK Fukuyama 
Setetsujo (NKK Fukuyama Iron and Steel Works). 1990.
Fig.30, A plan of a coastal integrated iron and steel 
works (Fukuyama Works)
Source: Pamphlet of Nihon Kôkan Co. Ltd., NKK Fukuyama 
Seitsujo (NKK Fukuyama Iron and Steel Works). 1990
Fig.31, LD Converter.
Source: Pamphlet of Nihon Kôkan Co. Ltd., NKK Fukuyama 
Seitsujo (NKK Fukuyama Iron and Steel Works). 1990
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　　In addition to such rapid constructions 
of the huge blast furnaces and many LD 
converters, the Japanese iron and steel makers 
adopted new technology such as continuous 
casting that was developed in the Soviet 
Union during the 1950s, which was a method 
of directly rolling molten steel. Continuous 
casting radically economised the fuel and time 
needed for blooming and reheating. 
　　The locations of the coastal integrated 
i r o n  a n d  s t e e l  w o r k s  w e r e  s o m e w h a t 
grotesque. Many of them were built in the 
areas surrounding the Seto Inland Sea, which 
also had a high population density. The iron 
and steel works there generated air pollution 
and other public hazards, which included 
the Mizushima Asthma, the hot wasted water 
controversy in Kakogawa, Sakai air pollution 
controversy and others.
Oil refinement and petrochemical complexes 
(Kombinats): The Fluid Catalytic Cracking 
(FCC) process for effectively refining petroleum 
oil was developed in the United States during 
World War II as one of the wartime scientific 
and technological efforts. It drastically 
increased productivity in oil refinement by 
efficiently circulating, repeatedly restoring and 
reusing the catalyst. The excessive supply of 
naphtha accompanied with the usage of this 
process made the scientists and engineers eager 
to invent new effective ways to use naphtha 
within the chemical industry. Eventually a 
series of the scientific efforts to replace the 
starting material for polymer-chemical goods 
from acetylene to ethylene, which is easily 
obtained from naphtha, led to a radical change 
in the chemical industry. During 1950s, the 
oxychlorination process was invented to 
make vinyl chloride from ethylene. K. Ziegler 
discovered (and G. Natta improved) the special 
catalyst that contributed to the massive supply 
of polyethylene in the early 1950s. In 1959, 
Standard Oil of Ohio invented the Sohio process 
to make acrylonitrile from propylene and two 
German chemical companies, Höchst Co. and 
Wacker Co., jointly developed the Höchst-
Wacker process to make acetaldehyde from 
ethylene. Thus, almost all polymer-chemical 
goods, which were previously derived through 
the organic synthesis of carbon compounds, 
could now be obtained from naphtha ―one of 
the by-products of oil refinement.
　　 In t roduc ing  the  FCC process  and 
those petrochemical processes into Japan, 
the formerly Zaibatsu-affiliated chemical 
companies required the government to 
dispose its former Army and Naval fuel 
arsenals, which could serve as the bases for 
their new industries ―the oil refinement and 
petrochemical industry. In 1955, after much 
hesitation, the government accepted their 
request under the condition that they limit the 
variety of their products so as not to compete 
with the existing chemical companies that 
utilised carbide-acetylene organic synthesis 
until 1961. 
　 　 T h e  f o r m e r l y  Z a i b a t s u - a f f i l i a t e d 
chemical companies rushed into successively 
Fig.32, A view of an oil refinement and petrochemical 
complex (Yokka-ichi).
Source: Internet Source (https://sspec1days.exblog.jp/ 
18409697/).
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constructing large-scale industrial complexes 
that combined petroleum oil refinement and 
petrochemical processes. These complexes were 
called Kombinats, which is a term derived from 
a Russian word. They were often built at the 
sites that formerly hosted the Army and Naval 
fuel arsenals. Nippon Petrochemical Industry 
Co. Ltd. constructed an oil-refinement and 
petrochemical industrial complex in Kawasaki 
city, Mitsubishi Petrochemical Co. Ltd. did the 
same at the site of the former Second Naval 
Fuel Arsenal in Yokka-ichi, Mitsui Petrochemical 
Co. Ltd. did so at the site of the former Iwakuni 
Army Fuel Arsenal and Sumitomo Chemical 
Industry Co. Ltd. built such a complex in 
Nîhama. The industrial complexes in Iwakuni 
and Nîhama began their operations as early 
as 1958. The surprisingly rapid and grotesque 
growth of the oil-refinement and petrochemical 
complexes without sufficient environmental 
protection measures resulted in causation of 
severe diseases (asthma and others), especially 
among the Yokka-ichi inhabitants, due to 
exposure to polluting emissions. In addition, 
the local residents were also affected by other 
issues, such as the noise pollution generated by 
these complexes. 
　 　 T h e  c o m p a n i e s  t h a t  c o n t i n u e d  t o 
utilise old, non-petrochemical processes 
faced significant challenges due to the 
disadvantageous competition with the rapidly 
growing petrochemical industry. One such old 
company that was cornered by flourishing of 
the petrochemical industry, Shin-Nihon Chisso 
Hiryô (nitrogenous fertiliser) Co. Ltd. (later 
known as Chisso Co. Ltd.), tried to overcome 
these challenges by adopting petrochemical 
processes on the basis of its own funds, which 
were to be accumulated through the radical 
increase of its output of acetic acid derivates. 
This reckless increase in production brought 
about the most tragic public health issue in the 
modern history of Japan―Minamata Disease. 
It was caused due to mercury poisoning that 
occurred due to the excessive emissions of 
mercury from the mercury catalyst that was 
used for synthesis of acetaldehyde. The victims 
of this disease often suffered from paralysis of 
limbs, speech disorders, hearing disability, a 
narrowed field of vision and other symptoms. 
Since 1953, which was when the first patient 
was identified, the responsibility (guilt) of 
Chisso Co. Ltd. was not clarified until the 
judgement that was delivered in the district 
court in 1973.4 Therefore, the disease was 
widespread. Although only 1,343 patients were 
confirmed by the government as victims of the 
diseased as of 1982, it is often estimated that 
it had 10,000 patients and that 200,000 people 
suffered from it in any aspects. 
3. The Tremendous Development of the Large-
scale Mechanical Assembly Industries　
　　The rapid growth of some machine-building 
industries also shapes the fundamental feature of 
the High Economic Growth. Therefore, we trace 
the development of the ship-building industry 
[based mainly on Literature ⑭] and the automobile 
manufacture [based mainly on Literature ⑮] here. 
The ship-building industry :  During the 
Japanese-Chinese War and Pacific War, naval 
ship-building was prioritised over civilian ship-
building. Therefore, once the war was over, 
many civilian ships were already decrepit. In 
addition, the air raids that were conducted 
by the US avoided the shipbuilding yards 
because of their strategic plan for the post-
war occupation. Thanks to them, ship-building 
became the heavy industry that was recovered 
earlier than any other heavy industry. In terms 
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of launch volume, Japanese ship-building was 
the best in the world as early as in 1952. 
　　The new technologies for ship-building 
were drawn from the United States. The 
welding process completely replaced riveting. 
The process reduced the weight of ships and 
shortened the time needed for ship-building. 
The block construction method effectively 
turned a hull construction into a quick 
assembly process, wherein blocks that were 
previously prepared in the factories were made 
into a ship at the yard.
　　Most remarkably, many mammoth tankers 
were built in post-war Japan. This supported 
the large-scale conversion of industrial fuel 
from coal to petroleum oil. In 1962, a giant 
tanker called Hitachi-maru was launched. It 
had a displacement of 130,000 tons. In 1966, 
the Idemitsu-maru, which was the largest 
tanker in the world at the time due to its 
displacement of 210,000 tons, was launched. 
　　To build such mammoth tankers and other 
large ships, several ship-building companies 
constructed huge new shipyards. Ishikawa-jima 
Harima Heavy Industry Co. Ltd. constructed 
a shipyard in Yokohama, Hitachi Ship-building 
Co. Ltd. did so in Sakai, Kawasaki Heavy 
Industry Co. Ltd. constructed one in Sakaide, 
Mitsui Ship-building Co. Ltd. did the same in 
Chiba, Nihon Kôkan (Steel Pipe Co. Ltd. Now 
known as Universal Zôsen Ship-building Co.) 
constructed a shipyard in Tsu, Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industry made one in Kôyagi and Sumitomo 
Heavy Machine-building Co. Ltd. did so in 
Oihama.
T h e  a u t o m o b i l e  i n d u s t r y :  T h e  r a p i d 
Fig.33, Minamata diseased.
Source: Minamata Forum, Minamata Ten (Pamphlet of 
Minamata Exhibition). 1999. p.36.
Fig.34, Block construction method.
Source: Nippon no Gijutsu 100nen (A Century of Japanese 
Technology) Vol.3: Zôsen, Tetsudô (Ship-building and 
Railroad). Chikuma Pub., 1987. p.71.
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development of the oil refinement industry 
resulted in the abundant supply of cheap 
gasoline. To create the corresponding demand 
for petroleum oil, the government settled on 
a series of policies to construct new highways 
and other motorways as the fundamental 
infrastructure for the so-called “Motorisation” 
(through the [First] National Comprehensive 
Development  Plan from 1962 to  1969, 
followed by the New National Comprehensive 
Development Plan from 1969 to 1977). In 1963, 
a section of the Meishin Highway between 
Rittô Interchange and Amagasaki Interchange 
was opened as the first highway in Japan. 
This “Motorisation Drive” eventually brought 
about the overall conversion of fuel from coal 
to petroleum oil and the closure of many 
coal mines throughout Japan. A great labour 
dispute that occurred during the shutdown 
of Mitsui-Miike coal mine was severely fought 
from 1959 to 1960. 
　　Supported by such governmental policies, 
many mechanical manufacturers that were 
previously engaged in the military armament 
industry entered into the young and promising 
industry of automobile assembly. For example, 
Tôyô Kôgyô (Industry) Co. Ltd., which earlier 
manufactured Type 38 rifles ―the major infantry 
equipment of Japanese Imperial Army― and 
other mechanical products, turned into Mazda 
Motor Corporation which is presently one of 
the major automobile manufacturers in Japan. 
Nakajima Hikôki (aircraft) Co. Ltd., which used 
to manufacture Zero Fighters, became Fuji 
Industry Co. Ltd. It was followingly divided 
into Fuji Heavy Industry Co. Ltd. (now known 
as Subaru Corporation) and Prince Automobile, 
which was later absorbed into Nissan Automobile. 
　　Some automobile manufacturers like 
Nissan, Hino Diesel Co. and Isuzu launched 
their business through knocked-down production 
contracts with foreign companies. Nissan 
created the Austin A40 as early as 1953 in this 
manner. On the other hand, Toyota pursued its 
own independent development. Its effort led to 
the creation of the Toyota Crown RS in 1955. 
　　Japanese automobile manufacturers 
introduced progressive technology that was 
derived from the United States. In 1953, Toyota 
Fig.35, Idemitsu-maru.
Source: ibid., p.81.
Fig.36, A giant shipyard with a goliath crane (in 
Oihama)
Source: ibid., p.77.
Fig.37, Toyota Crown RS.
Source: Internet Source (https://221616.com/car-topics/ 
20080214-a49055/)
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introduced fifteen 1,000 ton press machines. 
Nissan installed transfer machines at its 
Yokohama Factory. This factory is said to be 
the first (Detroit-type) automation factory in 
Japan.
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X. The Consequences of the High 
Economic Growth.
　　However, building giant plants required a 
long “pregnancy period” of capital. In addition, 
the reduction in the operation of large-scale 
apparatuses occasionally leads to catastrophic 
profit rates. Therefore, the maintenance of full 
or quasi-full operation became the “supreme 
proposition” for the entrepreneurs. As a result, 
Japanese people suffered due to the chronic 
inflation and the potential excessive supply, 
which eventually resulted in the economic 
crisis of 1974-75.
　　The large-scale industrial investment 
was often accompanied by “saving” the anti-
pollution equipment and the safety facilities. 
Thus, the Japanese also suffered significantly 
due to environmental pollution. The most 
serious case was perhaps the air pollution 
generated by a huge oil refinement and 
petrochemical complex in Yokka-ichi city. 
　　The rapid development of oil refinement 
in postwar Japan increased the utilisation 
of petroleum oil. The government undertook 
a policy called “Motorisation Drive,” which 
supported the increased consumption of 
petroleum oil by constructing highways and 
motor ways and encouraged thermal power 
generation using heavy oil as fuel, which led 
to the closure of coal mines. The rapid increase 
of the use of heavy oil further facilitated 
environmental pollution. 
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